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Summary:
This paper uses as a point of departure the extensive soil erosion problems in the highland
area of Western Tanzania. The first part of the paper focuses on the ongoing debate on land
reforms in Tanzania, particularly the question of state, vil age or private land ownership. In
the sec ond part, a microeconomic model of farm decision-making is developed, where the
focus is on two factors which are important to the magnitude of soil erosion: (i) existing
intensity of production (overexploitation of land), and (ii) investments in soil conservation. We
also develop a model to study migration to/from the highlands, and thereby the impact of
different property regimes and other economic factors on soil erosion.
Sammendrag:
Dette notatet tar som utgangspunkt den omfattende jorderosjonen i høylandet i Vest-Tanzania.
I notatets første del relateres dette til den pågående debatten om landreformer i Tanzania,
spesielt spørsmålet om statlig, landsby eller private eiendomsrett. I andre delen utvikles en
mikroøkonomisk modell for beslutninger i jordbruket, hvor fokus er på to faktorer som er
viktige for omfanget av j orderosj on: (i) dyrkningsintensitet (overutnyttng av jord), og (ii)
investeringer som reduserer jorderosjon. Vi utvikler også en modell for å studere migrasjon
til/fra høylandet, og derigjennom effekten av ulike eiendomsforhold og andre økonomiske
variable på jorderosjon.
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1 Introduction and overviewl
The problem of land degradation in tropical agriculture is caused by the aggregate
effect ofnumerous decisions by farming households. Farmers respond to the
natural, cultural, social, political, legal, and economic environment that surrounds
them. In this paper we emphasize the economic factors and argue that these are the
major determinants of farmers' choices. In particular, we focus on two sets of
economic variables; the property rights regime governing land use, and the
relative prices.
A basic tenet in the economic theory of property rights is that farmers have greater
incentives to invest in land improvements the greater his certainty that the land
wil belong to him or his descendants in the future. We raise the question of
whether this implies that soil conservation presumes private property rights. We
argue that individualized titling may not necessarily provide the answer. Instead
we argue that reinstitutionalization of the customary tenure system may secure
land rights of the individual farming household, and thus strengthen the farmers'
incentives to invest in soil improving measures. A major challenge in this respect
is to develop procedures and practices which make the allocation of vilage lands
transparent and subject to public scrutiny.
We use the highlands zone of Western Tanzania as our frame of reference.
Because of its high altitude (1440 to 17 50 meters above sea level) and regular
rainfall (annual precipitation varing from 800 to 1600 mm), the area has a high
agricultural and forestry potential. The major staple crops are bananas, cassava,
beans, and other food crops. All these products may also be sold as cash-crops.
Coffee production has been introduced recently (see Mwalyosi, 1992; and
Fjeldstad, 1993). People also keep livestock, mainly poultry, cattle, goats, and
sheep.
A number of factors has contributed to overutilization of land resources in the
area, resulting in deforestation, caused mainly by shifting cultivation, overgrazing,
and wild fires. This has led to extensive removal of natural vegetation and
subsequent soil erosion and decline in agricultural productivity. In the vicinity of
vilages the concentration of people has led to increased soil exhaustion, reduction
of grazing land, overgrazing and deforestation, and to more intensive use of land
for cropping.
Today, these problems are particularly evident by the existence of pOOl' and
unproductive soils in parts of the area, long distances covered in search of
firewood, widespread red scars on the land, gully erosion and frequent famines. In
addition, the watersheds have been highly disturbed and most of the formerly
We would like to thank Sufian Hemed Bukurura, Espen Sjaastad, Ussif Rashid Sumaila, and
Arne Wiig for several constructive comments to and suggestions for improvements of earlier
drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. Earlier versions of this paper have been
presented at the Joint CSAE/CMI Workshop on Land Reform, Oxford, March 1 - 3, 1995, and
at the annual conference of the Norwegian Association for Development Research (NFU),
Trondheim, June 6 - 8, 1995.
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perennial swamps and streams are now dry for most of the year. This has created
water shortages for both people and livestock, especially during the dry season.
People are forced to travellong distances in search of domestic water and water
for livestock breeding.
The adverse socio-economic and environmental effects characterizing. the re cent
developments in the area may be summarized as:
· changes in the local ecology as a result of pOOl' farming practices, livestock
husbandry, forestry development and haphazard settlement;
· changes in the hydrology of the area have imposed sedimentation loads on
the major river systems with adverse effects on the flows to the areas;
· competition and conflct in land resource use;
· overpopulation relative to the available resources leading to increased
pressure on the remaining resources; and
· migration of people to townships in the region and to Dal' es Salaam,
contributing to increased urban pressure.
Similar problems as described above can also be observed in other areas in
SubSaharan Africa (see e.g. Wachter, 1992; Place and Hazell, 1993; and Brekke et
aL., 1995). Thus the experience from Western Tanzania may have a wider
relevance, and can hopefully contribute to increased knowledge of the relationship
between land degradation, and land rights and economic policies.
This paper consists of two parts. Part one (sections 2 and 3) focuses on land rights
and land reforms in Tanzania, and relates these issues to theories of property
rights. In section 2 we define the concept of property rights, and identify four
broad categories of land rights regimes commonly used in the literature. The
present land tenure system in Tanzania is reviewed, and the proposed land rights
reforms by the Land Commission (1 994) is discussed.
Section 3 proceed by asking which criteria should be used to assess the (proposed)
land tenure regimes. We put forward and discuss four different criteria which are
of particular relevance for the discussion of alternative land rights regimes and
reforms in tropical agriculture: (i) Agricultural productivity and security of tenure;
(ii) internalization of environmental costs; (iii) land distribution and equity; and
(iv) trans action costs related to individualized titling to land.
The aim of part two (sections 4 and 5) is to discuss the potential role of various
economic factors in explaining the degree of land degradation. The emphasis is on
the effect of different property rights regimes as well as other economic factors
(particularly relative prices) in determining how farmers use and manage land
resources. This part provides a more formal discussion of some of the points made
in part one (sections 2 and 3) related to the first and second criteria for assessment
of property regimes.
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Section 4 presents a microeconomic model of farm decision-making. The focus is
on two variables which are important to the magnitude of soil erosion; (i) existing
intensity of production (overexploitation of land), and (ii) investments in soil
conservation. Section 5 discusses a more macro-oriented model, where the focus
is on factors determining the overall population in a region, and thereby the
pressure on land. We do not presently have suffcient data to test the relative
importance of the various effects discussed in these models. The purpose is more
to present possible effects (propositions) that should be considered in
policy-formulation, and which also provide a set of hypothesis for empirical
testing, and therefore could serve as a guide for more detailed empirical research.
2 Land rights in Tanzania
It is widely recognized that the property rights regime in place is a crucial factor in
determining resource allocation in tropical agriculture (see, for example, Bromley,
1991). The property regime is a key factor in determining which costs and benefits
are included in farmers' decision making, in particular to what extent long term
effects are included. Furthermore, the property rights approach draws attention to
the fact that subtle changes in the content of property rights can change the macro
performance of an economic system and lead to economic growth or stagnation.
Any redefinition of the structure of property rights by the state also has wealth
effects involving both winners and losers. The latter issue is of particular
importance in the Tanzanian economy which is dominated by agriculture.2
In this section we first define the concept of property rights and identify the land
rights regimes most commonly used in the literature. Next, we describe the main
characteristics of the Tanzanian land tenure system, and the land reforms proposed
by the recent Land Commission (1994).
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2.1 Property rights regimes
In simple terms, property rights are the rights individuals or groups of individuals
have to enjoy the benefits from a given resource, in our case land resources.3
Three types of property rights are generally distinguished between in the literature
(Barzel, 1989; Eggertsson, 1990:34);
L. Use rights: the rights which define the potential uses of land that are
legitimate for an individual, including the right to transform it physically
through, for instance, different agricultural crops and growing techniques.
2 Agriculture accounts for more almost 50 percent of GDP in current prices, 1991-93 (Bank of
Tanzania, 1993:14). It also accounts for nearly 70 percent of total export earnings (1992 and
1993), and provides employment for almost 90 percent of the labour force. See World Bank
(1994) for a more detailed presentation of the agricultural sector in Tanzania.
3 The term land, in its ground, soil, or earth-related sen se has a variety of meanings. The most
relevant definItion for our purpose is that which sees land as a factor of production. The reader
is referred to Wachter (1992: 6-7) for a listing ofthis and the other definitions.
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2. 1ncome rights: the right to earn income from the land and contract over the
terms with other individuals.
3. Transfer rights: the right to transfer the asset to another party, that is, to
alienate or sell the land.
A property institution consists of a set of rights and a set of duties or obligations
(Angelsen, L 995b). Legal rights are never unlimited. For example, the kind of uses
permitted by the law is often restricted (for instance, not growing opium), or the
income from agricultural output may be taxed. Possible restricfIons of these rights
that shrink the set of alternative us es or capture part of the incomes from land use
willower the economic value of the land.
Property arrangements are social relationship among individuals, "they link not
merelyaperson to an object, but rather a person to an object against other
persons" (Bromley, 1989:202). The key element of this triadic relationship is the
right of the owner to exc1ude others from the benefits related to the asset (use,
income, and transfer rights). In short, property rights give a person the legal right
to exc1ude others within the limits set by the law; to what extent these rights are
protected is, inter alia, determined by the person's own enforcement of the rights
(Angelsen, 1995b).
Property rights exist along a number of dimensions, thus any classification
represents a simplification of a complex reality. It is most common to distinguish
between four different property rights regimes (see, e.g., Bromley, 1991):
L. State property; the state holds the property rights.
2. Common (or communal) property; a group of individuals, for example a
community, holds the rights.
3. Private property; an individual or an household holds the rights.
4. Open access; no property rights exists (either de facto or de jure). 4
The main distinction is between situations with property rights (where the agent
with the rights is either the state, the community, or an individual), and situations
where no one has property rights, i.e. open access.
Whereas these four categories may c1arify the discussion on property rights
regimes, reallife regimes are likely to be a combination of these four (Bromley,
1989; Ostrom, 1990; and Wachter, 1992). In describing actual property regimes a
number of other dimensions must be added:
4 In addition to these four regimes, a global social planner's solution is of ten employed to define
the socially optimal solution, and acts as a yardstick to measure the outcome under the other
regimes. Parts of economic theory have traditionally not distinguished between state property
and the social planner's solution, but liule knowledge about tropical resource management is
needed to realize the lack of realism in this assumption. Homesteading could also be
considered a separate regime, which is particularly relevant in frontier areas: land
clearing/preparation gives private property rights to cleared land. Under this regime land is
transferred from an open access resource (regime 4) to a private property resource (regime 3).
See, e.g., Angelsen (1994).
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· How secure are the rights (c1aims)? The three first categories assume 100
percent security for the agent against third party intervention, whereas the
open access case assumes no security. The security of, for example, private
rights depends on the protection given to these rights by the state, and its
enforcement abilty.
· Property rights can be either formal (legal) or informal (customary or
traditional) rights. One difference is that it may be more difficult to enforce
informal rights than formal ones in a legal manner, andcustomar rights
may also receive less respect from potential users outside the community.
The existence of informal property rights makes enforcement difficult,
particularly against c1aims from outsiders (outside the vilage). The result
may be property rights insecurity and conflcts.
· Property rights are a bundle of rights, and the agent may not have all the
three types of rights listed above. Typically, a farmer may have the user
rights and the right to the income, but not the right to sell the land to
outsiders. More generally, property rights wil always be constrained, for
example, certain land uses may be prohibited.
· The agent may not be well defined; for example, individual households may
use land in a particular way after consultations with the leaders of the
community.
· Land may have different regimes governing different uses; for example,
agricultural use may resemble a private property regime, whereas collection
of forest products from the same land is governed by communal
management.
· Finally, another complication of the above categorization is the fact that
property rights wil never be full y delineated because of transaction costs
(see section 3.4).
2.2 The present land tenure system in Tanzania5
The Tanzanian land tenure system could probably be interpreted as a combination
of the state property regime, communal management and private property. This
situation partly reflects the fact that since independence mainland Tanzania has
not had an explicit policy on land tenure. In spite of such fundamental statements
of policy as the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the land tenure system has essentially
continued to be governed by the rules underlying principles of the Land Ordinance
of 1923, and is almost unaltered in its essehtials from colonialism (Land
Commission, 1994:135).6 The Tanzanian Constitution, for example, has no
5 This section draws mainly on the Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters, which we wil refer to as Land Commission (1994). The Commission submitted Its
report to the President on November IL, 1991.
6 According to the 1923 Land Ordinance (i) all land is publicly owned and under the control of
the state, (ii) land rights and titles are based on use, (iii) commoditization of and speculation in
land are proscribed, and (iv) rights of occupancy, the only recognized tenure, are held in two
ways: (i) under granted rights of occupancy, given subject to development conditions for up to
99 years, or (ii) deemed rights of occupancy or customary tenure, which, subjectto use, are
5
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provisions on land and land ownership, except for defining the territory of the
country for purposes of securing the political sovereignty of the state. Even major
policy programmes, such as the vilagization of the 1973-76, paid little regard to
issues of land tenure. One possible explanation is that the state also after
independence wanted to maintain its ultimate controlover land; another one could
be an underestimation of the importance of property rights.
The present land tenure system in Tanzania, as in many other developing
countries, is based on a system of dualism and hierarchy at the same time. The
dualism is between the peasant/pastoral sector governed by customary land tenure
under the deemed right of occupancy (usufructuary rights), and the
plantationlurban sector governed by the statutory system, with property rights
secured in the written national law. The structure is hierarchical in that the
statutory system is considered superior, with far greater security of tenure, than the
customary system. Progress in this hierarchy means movement away from the
customary to the statutory. In practice, this movement actually involves
expropriation of customary land, as has been the case throughout the colonial and
post-colonial history (Land Commission, 1994: 140).
Under many of the customary land tenure systems in Tanzania, the ultimate
ownership to land (the transfer right) was vested in a corporate entity such as the
tribe, the elan or the family. Use and income rights depended on membership of
the group. In the current structure the radical tide in all lands which are deelared to
be public land is vested in the President,
"and shall be held and administered for the use and common benefit, direct or
indirect, of the natives of Tangyanika, and no title to the occupation and use of
any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the President" (Land
Commission, 1994:19).
The President is empowered by the Land Ordinance to grant land by way of
occupancy. In practice, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
manages, administers, and allocates land. This means that the control and
administration of peasant or vilage lands lay in the hands of the state. In effect,
customary right holders in rural areas have been treated at best as
"tenants-at-wil", while those in urban are as are considered as "squatters". These
groups use the land but have little security. On the other side, the holders of the
graiìted rights of occupancy enjoy statutory security. for the stated period so long
as they use it according to prescribed conditions.
The vilagization programme (1973-1976) involved a large-scale relocation of
cultivators and pastoralists into vilages.7 The emphasize in this "operation
hel d in perpetuity.
7 The Tanzanian countryside is today organized in vilage communities. The latest tally shows
some 8,367 registered vilages. There may, however, be other traditional and newly established
vilages which have not been recorded or registered (Land Commission, 1994: 146).
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Tanzania"s, as it was called, was on modes of production. Little regard was,
however, paid to existing customary land tenure systems, and the "new" land
tenure system in the new locations was not thought through (Land Commission,
L 994:20). In some cases, land hel d under granted rights, but in practice abandoned
or neglected by land holders, was allocated to villages without any formal
procedures. This implied that the allocations of land within vilages to individual
farmers were unprotected by law.
Since the late 1980s some of the former land owners of abandoned farms and
estates have started to c1aim their land held under customary tenure which had
been alienated during vilagization. To meet the problem of widespread confusion
and dispute on land tenure in rural areas, the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi
(CCM) - the Revolutionary Party, in 1987 instructed the Government to complete
demarcation and titling of vilages under the legal regime of the Land Ordinance
within five years. However, by mid-199l, only 22 percent of the some 8 400
registered vilages had been surveyed. Only for 2 percent of the vilages
certificates had been registered (Skarstein and Havnevik, 1995:9).
The Land Commission (1994) argues that the whole procedure of preparing land
certificates was beset with legal and practical problems. First, the existing deemed
rights of vilagers on vil age land were not made clear, thus causing double
allocation and further confusion. Second, the right of occupancy of the vil age was
granted to the Vilage Council, a body controlled by the state, and not the Vilage
Assembly which was the only democratic vilage institution.
The government responded to the increasing problems related to land tenure to
enact a new law (Act to regulate land tenure in established vilages of 1992) which
extinguished all rights of occupation of land based on customary law in
established vilages. This law, however, was challenged at the Court of Appeal
which in January 1995 ruled the law unconstitutional and hence declared it
non-valid (Birgegård, 1995).
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The major problems with the present land tenure system can be summarized as
follows (Land Commission, 1994:33):
· Procedures for allocating land are of ten disregarded or bent.
· Neither procedures nor practices of land allocation are transparent, open and
subject to public scrutiny and challenge, thus facilitating abuse and
malpractices.
· There is no clear law on the alienabilty of certain areas, such as
conservation areas, leaving a wide discretion to civil servants and
politicians, including the Ministers, concerned.
8 "Operation Tanzania" is probably better known by the name "operation vijiji" (Land
Commission, 1994:40).
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· Vilages lack firm controlover the allocation of vilage land. Vilage land
have thus become a pawn in the hands of powerful officers and organs of the
central and local governments.
· There is a c1ear tendency towards alienation of large tracts of vil age lands to
"outsiders" .
2.3 Land reform recommendations
The principle underlying the Tanzanian corpus of customar law as well as the
concept of rights of occupancy, is that land is for use and not simply a commodity
at the disposal of the owner to do with it what he or she likes. The ultimate control
over use and disposal of land lies in the community. The Land Commission
maintains this principle in its recommendations. The other principle, which is also
not new, is that security of land tenure depends on its use. With reference to the
three types of property rights discussed in section 2.1, the Tanzanian system
includes both the rights for individuals to use the land and the right to earn income
from it.
The Land Commission (1994) recommends that the organizing principle for the
land tenure structure to be a multiple land tenure system based on varied forms of
land ownership and interests. It further recommends that all land in Tanzania be
divided into national lands and vilage lands. Vilage lands are defined as all
lands fallng within the boundaries of vilages, whether or not registered, while
national lands are a residual category defined as all lands which are not vil age
lands. Nonetheless, national lands constitute a significant portion of the land
surface with respect to land use.
Vilage lands wil, according to the Commission's recommendation, be vested in
the respective Vil age Assemblies who hold land for the benefit of the vilagers
being members of the vilage.in question. Where there are land traditionally used
as commons, and extending over more than one vilage, for example pasturelands,
then such adjoining vil age assemblies wil have to enter into agreements for the
use of the commons by the vilagers of all the vilages concemed. All adult
members of the vil age are members of the Vil age Assembly. Thus, there is a
c10se identity between the assembly and the rights-holders (Land Commssion,
1994: 146). The idea behind this is that the monopoly of the government over the
control and management over land, should be done away with. At the same time,
by maintaining the principle of the ultimate owner (or radical title), the
Commssion vests the ultimate controlover land in the communities concerned,
not in the state on behalf of and for the communities (Land Commssion,
1994: 141).
The ongoing economic and policy reforms in Tanzania implies a change towards a
market exchange economic system. Thus, it may seem inconsistent with the
governments macroeconomic policy when the Land Commission (1994) does not
recommend individualized titlng to land, and instead argues for a land tenure
system where the ultimate controlover and use of land lies in the community,
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vested in the Vil age Assemblies. When the state or the local community, as in
this case, imposes limits on exclusive rights, we may refer to these restrictions as
attenuation of property rights. However, property rights to land in Tanzania are to
some extent unattenuated since individuals have the rights to use and to earn
income from the land, although restrictions on individual rights to trade in land
exist.
This possible inconsistency may explain the fact that the Tanzanian president
recently has appointed a new land commssion which shall, particularly, focus on
the possibilties of privatizing customary land, i.e., establishing individualized
titling to land. This may also reflect external pressure from, for instance, the
Wodd Bank. The World Bank seems to regard title to property as necessary to
encourage farmers to improve the land and maintain soil fertility (World Bank,
1989). Another explanation for the political drive towards legal private property
rights may be the possibility for a change in the agricultural priorities, and the
"signs of an awakening of Tanzania's long-rumored agricultural potential are to be
sought not among smallholders but among larger commercial farms" (Putterman,
1995: 321).
To complete the uncertainty of the future land tenure, Havnevik and Skarstein
(1995:30) report that the Government is about to enact a new Land Policy Law,
which, in contrast to the Land Commission's recommendations and the World
Bank policy, wil continue to vest the radical title of land with the President.
3 Criteria for assessment of land rights reforms
Which criteria should be used to assess the (proposed) land rights regimes in
Tanzania? In general, actual land rights regimes would be the result of a
combination of a natural evolution (as argued by the evolutionary theory of land
rights, see Platteau, 1995), and the land tenure policy of the country. The relative
importance of these two sets of factors remains an issue of controversy. It is the
land tenure policy which is the direct choice variable, and we need criteria to make
policy assessments and recommendations. In this section, we put forward and
discuss four different criteria (or objectives) which are of particular relevance for
the discussion of alternative land rights regimes and reforms in the study area:
l. Economic efficiency, here specified as agricultural productivity.
2. Environmental conservation.
3. Distribution and equity.
4. Transaction costs.
One could argue that the environmental concern and the transaction costs should
be part of an overall assessment of the economic efficiency (i.e., 2 and 4 to be
inc1uded in 1). However, we have for c1arity of exposition chosen to separate
these, and limit the efficiency discussion to on-farm agricultural productivity.
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3.1 Agricultural productivity and tenure security
From an economic efficiency point of view security of land rights is important for
securing investments on the land, including investments in soil conservation or
soil improving technologies. In the literature, usually three main arguments have
been raised in favour of the granting of individualized titling of land (freehold
title), under which complete usage rights and transferabilty are vested in the
owner (Barows and Roth, 1990; Wachter, 1992; and Pinckney and Kimuyo,
1994) :
1. The farmer has greater incentive to invest in land improvements and indude
the long term effects of his current decisions, the greater his certainty that
land wil belong to him and his descendants in the future.
2. Titled land can be used as collateral to secure loans, thereby increasing the
funds available for agricultural investments.
3. Assuming that the only value of land is its agricultural use, and assuming
that no other impediments to increasing scale exist, more efficient farmers
should be able to buy out their less efficient neighbours in a transaction that
is beneficial both for farmers and society as a whole. Thus, productivity in
the agricultural sector wil rise over time as a result of these transactions.
The term "security of land" often refers to two aspects. First, it refers to security
against loss of land. Second, it refers to security of investments in, and on, land.
These two aspects are, of course, very much interrelated. In much of the economic
literature, however, it is the sec ond meaning of the term which is referred to. The
security aspect is, in general, used as the main argument for private or
individualized titling to land. However, if security of land rights are to be secured
through traditionalland tenure forms, this argument should be reconsidered. The
key question would then be: Can the land tenure system recommended by the
Land Commission (1994) provide sufficientsecurity of land rights?
There is obviously an implicit security in the customary land rights system.
However, the credibility of the system rests on the stability of the government and
the credibilty of its policy, and the legal protection given to traditional rights by
the state. In particular, the credibility rests on the policy measures taken to secure
vilage controlover the allocation of vil age lands, and to eliminate the present
tendency towards alienation of vilage lands to outsiders by powerful civil servants
and politicians. One of the strongest arguments in favour of individualized
property rights is that it makes land mortgageable and thereby increases the
farmers' access to credit (see, e.g. World Bank, 1989). Secure rights wil,
according to this line of arguments, provide incentives for individuals to improve
their land and "help rural credit markets to develop, because land is a good
collateral" (World Bank, 1989:104). The use of land as collateral is dependent on
the third dass of property rights outline d in section 2.1, that is the transfer rights.
However, the relevance of this argument on the accessibility of credit requires at
least three assumptions to be fulfiled.9 First, such credit must be available to a
9 See, e.g., Land Commission (1994: 119).
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fairly substantial number of peasants. Second, there should be in place a
developed financial infrastrueture to advance credit to the agriculture sector. This
in turn assumes an efficient and relatively independent judicial machinery to
enforce ultimate forec1osures. Three, land-linked security must be the only (or the
only one which is good) form available to organize rural credit. Empirical
evidence from Tanzania, as well as from other SubSaharan African countries,
have thrown considerable doubts on the validity of these assumptions. Other
bottlenecks than lack of collateral seem to be more important for the provision of
rural credit (Platteau, 1995). Place and Hazell (1993), in a statistical survey of
regions in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda, find that credit use was so infrequent in
most regions that statistical analysis could not be used. In the three remaining
regions, they find a positive, a negative, and no relationship, respectively, between
land rights and credit use.
The demand for security of land in the vilages in Tanzania is mainly confined to
the security against loss of land, inc1uding the investments made. Vilagers fear
the loss of their lands, which is their main means of livelihood, through various
means and mechanisms: Alienation of land to outsiders; government expropriation
of vilage lands; urban expansion in to vilage lands; etc., are examples of cases
causing insecurity (see Land Commssion, 1994: L 18). However, titling itself does
not necessarily provide security against such risks of loss of land held by
smallholders. The apparent insecurity of customary holders in Tanzania has been
caused through a systematic administrative practice which has relegated
customary rights to a secondary place, inferior to statutory land rights. Baring
such practice, customary rights have the added advantage of legitimacy in, and
supervision by, the immediate community, thus, enhancing their security. The
security thus provided may then also be sufficient for such investments as may be
generated within the peasant communities themselves. On the other hand, the
security provided by the title,particularly to a land holder from outside the vilage
community, has proved to be ilusory in many cases. The very process of land
alienation to an outsider in the face of the needs of vilagers generates, according
to Land Commssion (1994: 118), such hostility that it undermines the security
promised by the registered title.
According to the arguments in favour of individualized land entitlement, the
presumed added security gained by titling is supposed to induce more investment
in land improvements directly, while the increased availability of land-secured
credit should increase these investments indirectly. However, Barows arid Roth
(1 990), drawing on a variety of sources, ilustrate that in Kenya security of tenure
was not increased with titling. Further, there was litte evidence of a correlation
between titlng and overall long-term investment. Finally, a "well-functioning"
land market did not develop after titling since customary law was stil determining
sales and successions. Overall, it is hard to establish general empirical
relationships between land titlng, on the one hand, and agricultural productivity,
input use, land investments, and credit use, on the other.
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In arecent comparative study on land tenure reforms in Kenya and Tanzania,
Pinckney and Kimuyo (1994: 10) found that many farmers would never accept a
land-secured loan if there were the least possibility of losing their land. Land for
these people is worth more than its collateral value or the income from agricultural
use. If profitable investments entail some risk, demand for land-secured loans may
not materialize.
The sentiments against titling of land, may parly be explained by the fact that land
is much more than simply a factor in economic production to a smallholder. Loss
of agriculturalland often means the loss of livelihood, and virtual marginalization
and eventually destitution. It is not surprising, therefore, that when possible
implications are understood, rural smallholders are very reluctant to use land as a
collateral. Further, land continues to be the central force around which the rural
people's spiritual and cultural life is organized. Tampering with land therefore
means tampering with the social and psychological fabric of the society (Land
Commission, 1994: 119). Kinship ties remain strong and ethnic, local or regional
feelings remain central considerations in social and political life. Land is thereby
prevented from becoming a tradable commodity. People are often emotionally
attached to "theil''' land which represents an important source of their identity . The
"value" of land is embedded in the social structure and history of a particular
community and has a significant symbolic component (Platteau, 1995:18). Thus,
land represents far more than a mere input into an agricultural enterprise and it is
impossible to abstract it from all the social, ritual, affective and political meanings
associated with it.lO
An immediate consequence of the central role of land as a source of identity and
self-esteem is that original occupants are éxtremely keen to retain their land, even
when they reside in towns, all the more so as loss of land implies discontinuance
of rituals to ancestors. The reluctance to part with ancestral land is especially
strong when it threatens to go to outsiders (Land Commssion, 1994; Platteau,
1995).
3.2 Internalization of environmental costs
Environmental conservation could be considered as one kind of investments in the
long term productivity of land. The discussion in section 3.1 on security of tenure
is, therefore, very much interrelated with the discussion to what extent farmers
wil inc1ude the environmental consequences in their decisions. A major argument
in the economic literature is that tenure security is essential if farmers are to
incorporate long term on-farm environment al costs in their decisions. This is
elaborated in a more formal way in section 4; thus we limit our discussion here.
10 Such sentiments may seem to be universaL. Lewis (1955:91), for example, writes that "there is
probably no country in the world where land is bought and sold solely for its value as a factor
of production, and no country where non-economic factors do not frustrate schemes which
would otherwise increase output".
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As shown formally in section 4, tenure is but one of many factors influencing
farmers' decisions. Tenure security is no guarantee against environmental
degradation to take place, for at least two reasons. First, even though farmers
under tenure security wil inc1ude on-farm environmental costs, an optimal
strategy for the farmer may stil be to degrade the land. This may be due to high
discount rates and short time horizons, for example because of poverty, or other
factors that make the farmers' decisions more short-term in character (see section
4). Cárcamo et aL. (1995), in a study from Honduras show that even optimal farm
plans, with secure tenure and a long time horizon, wil produce unacceptable high
rates of erosion.
Second, farmers wil even under secure tenure have limited incentives to inc1ude
off-site (or off-farm) environmental consequences into their decisions. Such effects
are considered external costs (or externalities), i.e., they affect others than the
decision-maker. This is a key issue in environmental economics to explain why
environmental problems arise. Thus, tenure security is often necessar, but not
sufficient to make farmers take into account the full range of environment al
consequences of their decisions.
3.3 Land distribution and the equity-efficiency debate
Land Commssion (1994: 120) argues that individualized titling of land may have
unwanted distributional effects due to accumulation of land in fewer hands. This
view is also in accordance with the first Tanzanian governments belief that the
equity concerns were more important than the efficiency considerations, thus
abolishing private land titles shortly after independence. However, in recent years,
a number of authors have argued that casting the land tenure debate in Africa as
one of equity versus efficiency is incorrect. Pinckney and Kimuyo (1994:16), for
instance, argues that the evidence provided so far gives little credence to the
equity concerns regarding land entitlement. The equity versus efficiency debate
are challenged on three grounds:
l. Indigenous land rights were rarely communal in areas of permanent
cultivation. Individual households were usually allocated plots of land that
remained theirs to cultivate as long as they wished; in addition, land was
inheritable. Thus, use rights and transfer rights to heirs were secure
(Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994:4).1l
2. Indigenous land rights have not been static. Rather, as the advantages of
individualized tenure have grown, tenure systems have evolved towards the
granting of private rights (Cohen, 1980). Although in most cases the right to
sell land outside the lineage group is stil restricted, all other rights are
frequently allocated to individuals.12 Since security of tenure is not suspect
ii See also section 2.1.
12 The terms "lineage" refers here to a group of persons with a common ancestor who continue to
live in close contact with each other.
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under such arrangements, there would be no increased security under
freehold title and thus no direct impact on investment.
3. It is possible that the vil age assembly could continue to control the
allocation of land in their are as even after title deeds have been issued (or
the government has nationalized all lands). Pinckney and Kimuyo (1994:5)
refers to evidence that this has occurred in Tanzania, where rights granted or
withheld by the legal system may not be de facto rights. if the granting of
legal freehold tenure does not provide the owner with complete
transferability rights, titled land wil neither contribute to greater incentives
to invest in land improvements nor improve the possibilties to use titled
land as collateral to secure loans.
Reliance on local communities may also offer other important advantages such as
social security to its members. Even though social differentiation should not be
underestimated, Tanzanian vil age communities tend to provide some social
security to their members, and to provide a more equal opportunity for everybody
to participate in new opportunities. Thus, considerations of equity and social
security may often dominate considerations of economic efficiency. In agenerally
insecure economic environment, this should probably be regarded as a positive
contribution (Posner, 1980; Runge, 1986; Bardhan, 1993; Platteau, 1995).
The issue of land distribution wil become more pressing as land scarcity
increases. According to Putterman (1995: 312) only 13 percent of potentially
arable land is currently cultivated, the share obviously being much higher in
densely populated regions. Higher land scarcity implies that some wil get more
land than other, the issue being by which criterion land should be allocated:
Economic (market) power, or local or national political power, cf. Table l.
Formal ownership Main type of power
(transfer rights) determining land allocation
Present system President National political power
Land Commission Vil age assemblies Local political power
Full private property Individuals Market (economic) power
Table 1. Diferent types ofpower determining land allocation.
3.4 Transaction costs and the case of individualized titling to land
Property rights wil never be fully delineated because of transaction costs
(Angelsen, 1995b). Transaction costs can be defined as "the costs that arise when
individuals exchange ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their
exclusive rights" (Eggertsson, 1990: 14), or "the costs associated with the transfer,
capture, and protection of rights" (Barzel, 1989:2). Thus, one may distinguish
between transaction costs related to three different activities:13
13 Cf. Eggertsson (1990: 15).
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1. Information: costs associated with the search for information about price,
quality and (sometimes) quantity of economic goods.
2. Contracts: costs related to bargaining, monitoring and enforcement of
contracts.
3. Enforcement of property rights: costs incurred by the rightholder's efforts to
protect the rights.
Unlike conventional neo-c1assical economic analysis which regard such rights as
absolute, the inc1usion of transaction costs in the analysis of property rights
implies that "rights are never complete, because people wil never find it
worthwhile to gain the entire potential of Il their 
Il assets (Barzel, 1989:2).
According to Barzel (1989), the security of rights people have over an asset is a
function of three factors: the rightholder's protection efforts, other people's capture
attempts, and the governments protection.
The existence of markets for productive assets, including land, is one of the most
important feature of a market exchange system based on private property. The
market price of a productive asset signals the opportunity co st of using the
resource in production, also taking into account potential future uses. Relative to
other arrangements, the market provides this critical information at low co st. The
market value of a means of production is deri ved from the demand for goods and
services by final users, but its value depends also on the distribution of wealth and
the structure of private property rights (Eggertsson, 1990:37).
The value of exclusive (individualized) property rights depends, ceteris paribus,
on the cost of enforcing those rights, that is, the cost of exc1uding others, which
ultimately depends on coercion (Eggertsson, 1990:35). The enforcement of
exc1usive rights is usually undertaken by both the individual owners and the state.
Enforcement by the state increases the value of privately owned assets and
constitutes one of the cornerstones of market exchange. However, the credibility
of state enforcement depends also on the stability of the regime and the credibilty
of its policy. In areas where the state does not help to enforce contracts, but rather
prohibits possession and trade in lands, high transaction costs usually limit or even
prevent exchange.
Contrary to informal practices at vilage level which economize on information
costs, the introduction of formal land titling procedures is costly. Enforcement of
property rights involves excluding others from the use of scarce resources.
Exclusive or individualized ownership calls for costly measurement and
delineation of lands and enforcement of ownership rights. Such transaction costs
may be significant in a country like Tanzania, where the physical and
administrative infrastructure, in general, are of pOOl' quality. Thus, these costs
may, at present, be a major obstac1e to individualized titlng to land in Tanzania.
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3.5 The evolutionary theory of land rights and land reforms in
Tanzania
The Tanzanian Land Commission recommends that the ultimate controlover use
and disposal of vilage lands should be vested in the communities concerned. This
implies, a strengthening of local capacities for management, information and
dispute settlement, rather than imposing from above the mechanisms of a formal
state legal system (see Atwood, 1990:667).
These recommendations seem to be in accordance with Platteau's (1995)
evolutionary theory of land rights. Platteau (p. 37) argues that since experience
shows that direct state intervention in land matters often has been a major source
of farmers' insecurity in many African countries, and since vilage systems
frequently are able to evolve to meet new needs, indigenous land tenure systems
stil have a dominant role to play. Further, he argues that it is only when informal
institutions and practices are no more reliable methods of adjudicating land rights
and ensuring land tenure security that the government should consider undertakng
a formal registration procedure. Thus, what is needed is a gradualist and pragmatic
approach that "reinstitutionalizes indigenous land tenure, promotes the
adaptability of its existing arrangements, avoids a regimented tenure model, and
relies as much as possible on informal procedures at 10calleve1" (p. 37). The land
tenure system in Tanzania, as in other countries, has developed through an
evolutionary proeess. By institutionalizing the customary land tenure system
individual user rights may be secured, and thus the peasants' incentives to invest in
soil preserving and soil improving measures. However, a need for land titling and
registration may arise in a situation with growing uncertainties about the
application and effectiveness of the indigenous land tenure systems. This may,
according to Wachter (1992:92), take place when "there are uncertainties about
which are the legitimate authorities with power to control land use and land
transactions, and where land values and pressures on land are rising" .
Although tempting to romanticize the strengths of the traditional system, we
should be aware of possible pitfalls and failings. In the discussion above we have
pointed to some major problems with the existing traditional system, for instance,
land-grabbing by higher-placed officials and politicians, alienation of vil age lands
to domestie and foreign investors and tourist companies. In a situation with
increasing scarcity of land, a market based system of land allocation may
contribute to increased transparency. However,. the trans action costs of
implementing and enforcing a system of individualized titling to land, are
probably major obstacles presently against the introduction of a market based land
allocation system in Tanzania.
The above discussion leads us to the following tentative conc1usions on land
tenure reforms:
· There is no clear-cut relationship between land titles, and farm productivity,
input and credit use, and land investments.
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· Full tenure security is no guarantee against land degradation, but may be a
necessary condition for reducing environmental problems related to
traditional agriculture.
· Indigenous or customar land tenure systems evolve naturally in response to
local demand, in particular to the need for more individualized use and
income rights as land becomes more valuable.
· Large scale national land titling programmes do not seem to serve their
purpose and justify their costs. Land titles should, however, be offered as an
option to the farmers at reasonable costs.
· The fear of a more unequalland distribution when moving towards a system
of private property rights may seem exaggerated.
· When land becomes scarce, a more unequal land distribution wil often
evolve. Then, a main issue may be to decide on which type of power to
determine the land allocation: economic or political.
4 An economic analysis of farmers' decision-making
The aim of sections 4 and 5 is to discuss - based on economic theory - the role of
various factors in explaining the degree of land degradation (soil erosion) in the
highland areas of Western Tanzania. The emphasis is on the effects of various
property rights regimes as well as other economic factors (particularly relative
prices) in determining how farmers of the area use and manage land resources.
The objectives are first, to provide a more formal discussion of some of the points
made in earlier sections related to different criteria for assessment of property
regimes, second, to put the discussion of property rights in a wider perspective,
and, third, to show the relevance of other economic factors.
We do not presently have sufficient data to test the relative importance of the
various effects discussed. The purpose is more to present possible effects that
should be considered in policy-formulation, and which also provides a set of
hypothesis for empirical testing. Therefore, this approach may serve as a guide for
more detailed empirical research in the area.
We will also keep the formalization of the models at a relatively simple leve1, and
try to extract as much as possible from these in terms of economic mechanisms at
work and policy lessons. We believe that the reason for policy failures is not as
much a question of a lack of complex theories, but rather lack of understanding
and violations of simple economic principles.
Two sources of agriculturalland degradation can be distinguished (Wachter, 1990:
77). First, there is land degradation stemmng from the overexploitation of land
resources. Second, land degradation can stem from the underinvestment in land.
The theoretical discussion wil in part be divided along these lines. In this section
we present a simple two-period model of individual farmers' decision-making (a
micro approach), relating soil erosion to the present intensity of production
(overexploitation) and investments in soil conservation. This wil identify a
17
number of factors which influence farmers' exploitation of and investments in
land. In the following section 5 we focus on migration, and factors which
determine the total population in a region (a macro approach). High population
pressure may result in overexploitation of land (the first source of land
degradation).
4.1 A two-period model
This section presents a simple, two-period model of farmers' decision-making.
The aim is to use the results derived from the model to undertake a structured
discussion of the causes of soil degradation. Soil erosion is one type of land
degradation that has received some attention in the literature (McConnell, 1983;
Wade and Heady, 1978; Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968; etc.).14 The key focus in the
literature is on the intertemporal choice: How to balance the short term production
gain of soil mining against its long term productivity loss? How much to invest
now in soil conservation to increase future productivity? Most models use the
mathematical technique of optimal control, which gives the optimal path over time
for the key variables (like soil depth). For the present purposes we wil present the
simpler two-period model of farmers' decision-making.15 In spite of its simplicity
compared to optimal control models, the two-period model produces most of the
insight derived from the former models. One should note that period 2 in the
model is to be interpreted as the future, and because of the unrealistic assumption
of no value of soil at the end of period 2 (salvage value), the focus is on period L
decisions.
A few more words on the underlying assumptions and limitations of the model are
in order:
· We assume that the objective is income maXImIZing, with all prices
exogenously given in the model (small, open economy assumptiori).16 This is
sufficient in order to present and discuss the structure of intertemporal
choice. An alternative formulation would be that farmers maximize
household utility, given the available family labour (Chayanov, 1966), or
that farmers minimize their labour efforts subject to a subsistence constraint.
The assumption used here is crucial for some of the policy effects, as
discussed below and in more details in Angelsen (1994; 1995a).
14 Burt (1981) presents a formal intertemporal model of soil use. As early as in 1968,
Ciriacy-Wantrup analysed soil as a renewable resource with a threshold leve! below which
resource use becomes irreversible. Bunce (1974) gives an economic analysis of soil
conservation in a static framework. McConnell (1983) focuses on the intertemporal path of soil
use including the conditions under which private and social optima diverge. The paper also
gives insight about effective instruments of erosion contro!. Barrett (1991) argues that pricing
reforms wil not affect soil conservation in developing countries dramatically.
IS See, for example, McInerey (1976) and Carlson et al. (1993), for an exposition of this type of
modeIling of natural resources.
16 We discuss below the possibility that the prices may be expected values, which does not violate
this assumption; the important point is that these stil are exogenous in the model.
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· The model includes some stochastic elements: a probabilty of loosing the
land, and expected values of future prices. The treatment of risk is, however,
the simplest possible, as we assume that farmers are risk neutral, allowing us
to apply the expected values directly. Introducing risk aversion would add
realism and inc1ude some new arguments, but complicate the model
considerably.17
· We only discuss on-site (on-farm) effects of soil erosion. Off-site effects
may be even more important, but are simpler from an analytical viewpoint;
the individual farmer would not under any property regime have incentives
to include off-site effects in his decision-making. Off-site or off-farm effects
relate to the traditional externality argument in environmental econoiics.
· Tenure security (the probabilty of not loosing the land between the first and
second period) is an exogenous variable in the model, which is another
simplification. In practice, it may depend on decisions made by the farmer
regarding intensity of production and other property rights enforcement
activities (inc1uding obtaining title deeds, if possible). There is a mutuallink
between property rights security and intensification and investments in land.
A model endogenizing tenure security is found in Angelsen (1995b), but for
the present discussion it is sufficient to keep tenure security exogenous.
· The model does not discuss the crop choice, which may have significant
effects on erosion rates. Cárcamo et aL. (1994) in a study from upland
Honduras, argues that this is among the most important decisions made by
the farmers. Analytically it is very simple to inc1ude crop choice in the
analysis; one just compares the income (net present value) from different
crops or crop mixes, and choose the one which gives the highest.
We focus on a representative farmer. The production function in period t is given
by;
(1) Yt=aú(Zt,xt); /¡~O;/¡;.cO;f!f1x-if1xf~O; f1x~o; i=z,x; t=I,2
Yi is yield (output per ha) in period t; at is a coefficient for the technologicallevel
in year t (if ai ~ aj' we have neutral technical progress); Zt is a vector of inputs
used in period t, or simpler a fixed combination of inputs; xt is the soIl stock (for
example as measured by soil depth) in period t.18 The production function is
concave: production is increasing with soil depth and with other inputs, but at a
decreasing rate.
17 See, for example, Ardila and Innes (1993) for a more realistic discussion of soil erosion and
risk.
18 What is commonly referred to as soil erosion could be distinguished Into two different, but
related, processes: Loss of topsoil and nutrient depletion. We assume that the land productivity
is dependent on the total stock of nutrients - NS (which could be further decomposed into
nitrogen, phosphor, etc.). The interesting variable NS can then be written as a product of
nutrient content (Ne) and the soil stock (SS): NS = NC * SS, where NC by definition is NU/SS.
At our level of abstraction, we have not distinguished clearly between these tWQ process,
although the mod el follows most models in the literature and focuses on soil depth or soil stock.
19
The key link between the two periods is the soil stock. The relationship is
modelled as follows;
(2) X2 =Xi +k-g(ZI,S)
gi ). O' glI o( O' gl o( O' glI o( O' glI o( O' gIlglI - (gll)2 ). O
z , zz , s , ss , zs , zz ss zs
k is the natural soil regeneration, I.e.,an exogenous addition to the soil base from
period L to period 2.19 From the stock in period L one also has to deduct the soil
loss due to agricultural production; g(ZI'X). This loss is assumed to be positively
related to the intensity of production in period l, as given by the amount of inputs
applied (Zl)' and negatively to investments in soil conservation (S).20
The farmers' decision problem is to maximize the income over the two periods,
that is the net present value (NPV), taking into account the soil dynamics in
equation (2). The NPV is given by;
(3) NPV = (PIYi - WIZi) - qs+ 8Â(P2Y2 - W2Z2)
Pi is the output price in period t; wl the input price (or a vector of input prices) in
period t; q is the price of soil conservation measures. The discount factor is
8 = l~r o( 1, where r is the discount rate. Â is the probabilty that the farmer wil
keep the land also in period 2. (1- Â) is the risk (probability) of loosing the land,
retlecting the tenure security.
The parameters (8Â) before period 2 income are both less than l. This implies that
the income in period 2 is given less weight in the decision problem for two
reasons; (i) discounting and (ii) the risk of loosing land. This is central in our
discussion, and wil be elaborated below.
The NPV is maximized with respect to three decision variables; zl' Z2' and s. The
expression to be maximized is given by inserting equations (1) and (2) into (3);
(4) NPV = piaif(zi ,x¡) - WiZi -qs+ 8ÂrP2aifZ2,Xi + k- g(ZI, s)) - W2Z21
The exogenous variables in the model are al' a2 Pl' P2' wi' W2, q, 8, Â, and Xl' but as
usual only relative prices matter (not their absolute levels). Given an interior
solution, the necessary conditions for maximum of (4) are given by the first order
conditions (FOC);
(5) aNPV . l' ~"l. l' l
-a = piaV z - Wi - Ur..P2aZ¡xgz = OZl
19 Alternatively, k could have been a function of the soil stock, but this would not have added
much to the modeL.
20 This may not always be the case, for example can higher intensity in terms of more inputs imply
that the soil is covered with vegetation for a longer period of the year, and thereby reduces the
exposition of bare land.
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(6) aNPV s:'1 _4 I-- = -q - u/\pZaLJ xgs = O
(7) aNPV s:'1 zt- = u/\(pza - wz) = OaZ2 z
The interpretation of these conditions are as follows. (5) describes the optimal
choice of input in period l. First, there is a yield gain in period l. This must be
balanced against the co st of purchasing inputs (w1). In addition, there is a loss in
terms of reduced productivity in period 2, as captured by the last term in (5).
(6) gives the optimal investments in soil conservation. The cost are given by q,
whereas the second term gives the discounted expected income from the
productivity gain in period 2 from the marginal investment. Finally, (7) is the
period 2 vers ion of (5), except that there is no third period in the model and the
effects on erosion of Z2 is therefore neglected. This follow from our limitation of
the model to two periods; thus our focus is here on Z1 and s, and on (5) and (6).
In both (5) and (6) the term ÒÂ appears, reflecting the weight given to productivity
changes in period 2 in the decisions made in period L on the intensity of
production and soil conservation investments. The higher this term is, the more
weight is given to the future over the present.
The optimality conditions in (5) and (6) are ilustrated graphically in Figures L and
2 below.
Marginal benefits
(increased production
in period 1)
Marginal costs
(input costs plus reduced
production in period 2)
Input costs
Inputs in period 1 (intensity)
Figure 1. Intensity ofproduction in period 1 (ziJ
Two different solutions are ilustrated in Figure l. The general case is given in
point A, where some weight is given to the productivity loss in period 2 due to soil
erosion. Point B is the extreme case when this loss is completely neglected, either
because of an infinitely high discount rate, or because the farmer considers the
chances for future production on the land to be nil because of the tenure
insecurity.
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Figure 2 similarly ilustrates equation (6). Under assumptions as in case B of
Figure l, there wil be no investments in soIl conservation.
Marginal benefits
(increased production
in period 2)
Cost of soil conservation (q)
Soil conservation investments
Figure 2. Investments in soil erosion (s).
Proposition 1: The magnitude of soil erosion (a function of present intensity of
production and soil conservation investments) is determined by an
intertemporal choice between the present costs and the future benefits of
higher agricultural productivity. Generally, factors which lowers the present
costs and/or increase the future benefits in the farmers decision problem wil
promote soil conservation.
4.2 What determines the magnitude of soil erosion?
This section gives a more detailed discussion of the various factors that affect
farmers' choices, in particular related to the magnitude of soil erosion. We do not
show formally the effect of changes in various exogenous parameters21, but the
results should follow intuitively by considering the equations (5) - (7) and Figures
L and 2.
Tenure (in)security
A crucial aspect of property regimes is the security it gives farmers: Can (s)he
expect to keep on farming the land? What are the chances of loosing it? Rather
than being a fixed probability for different regimes (e.g., private rights give 100
percent security), it should be thought of as a continuum of probabilities.Thus it is
difficult to give a general ranking of the various regimes, with the exception of
open access where the security (by definition) is zero. One should further note that
the security is a subjective variable; the key is how the farmers perceive the
security.
21 This could be done be total differentiation of (5) - (7), and solving with respect to the
endogenous variables.
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The effect of increased security is straightforward in the model. It implies that
farmers put more emphasis on the second period because the chances are greater
that they are able to continue farming. Graphically this implies that the curves
which give the marginal cost curve in Figure L and the marginal benefit curve in
Figure 2 wil move upwards. Period L inputs (z¡) wil decrease, whereas soil
conservation investments (s) wil increase.
Proposition 2: Increased security of tenure implies that farmers put more
emphasis on the future consequences of their present decisions. Thus, one gets
less intensive farming and increased investments in soil conservation, which
both reduce soil erosion.
Discount rate
We see from equations (5) and (6) that the discount factor enters the model in
exactly the same way as the probabilty of keeping the land (tenure security). A
higher discount rate (lower discount factor; õ) has the same effect as higher tenure
insecurity; the effect is more soil erosion.22 Note that also the discount rate is a
subjective factor, as À is. If the farmers had access to credit in a perfect credit
market, the market rate of interest would be the relevant discount rate. This is,
however, rarely the case in low income developing countries.
One important factor influencing the subjective discount rate is the level of
poverty. The poorer a society is the more the daily struggle for survival dominates
the decision-makng, and pre-empts any lon g term planning (World Commission,
1987; Jagannathan, 1989; Perrings, 1989).
Proposition 3: Higher discount rate (lower discount factor) has the same
effect as lower tenure security; it increases soil erosion. Poverty is a
contributing factor to high discount rates and myopic decision-making.
Output prices and technical change
From (5) - (7) we see that changes in the output price (Pi) and technical change (ai)
has exactly the same effect in the model; both increase the value of production for
a given set of inputs and soil stock. When the output price in period L increases
whereas the future one remains unchanged, the effect on the present intensity of
production is seen from Figure 1. The marginal value of productivity in period 1 is
boosted (the marginal benefit curve moves upward), and the result is increased
intensity of production.23 The intuition is straightforward: Production in period L
has become relatively more profitable, implying more intensive agriculture which
leads to more soil erosion.
22 The phenomenon that increased risk ofloosing a resource has exactly the same effect as higher
discount rate is well recognized in the resource economics literature, and is referred to as risk
discounting (see for example Clark, 1990).
23 The other curve may also change due to indirect effects via changes in soil stock in period 2.
We do not discuss this effect here, as it would not dominate the direct effect, and therefore not
change the results.
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The effect on soil conservation investments is less c1ear. Higher p l leads to lower
soil stock in period 2, as just argued, which may affect the marginal return on soil
conservation investments. A plausible assumption is that lower soil stock may
increase the marginal return on such investments, implying that s wil increase.24
The increase in soil conservation investments is, however, not sufficient to
compensate for the increase in intensity, and the net effect wil stil be more soil
erosion.
A higher output price in period 2 wil result in less intensive practices. Period 2
farming has become relatively more profitable, thus the erosion cost of present
farming has increased. Moreover , soil conservation investments wil be more
profitable and therefore increase. Both effects imply less soil erosion.
Note that future output prices are farmers' expected prices. Changes in
expectations about future prices is therefore sufficient to induce changes in
present farming practices. Expectations about a dec1ine in output prices wil
therefore induce the rational farmers to increase present farming intensity and
lower soil conservation investments, and thereby increase land degradation. One
may hypothesize that, for example, a general economic recession in a country may
increase pessimism and lower expectations about future output prices, and thereby
lead to increased environmental problems.
Proposition 4: Higher present output prices wil lead to more soil erosion,
whereas higher (expected) future output prices wil change farming practices
in favour of reduced soil erosion.
The above conc1usion is sensitive to our assumption that farmers maximize their
(discounted) income, and that all prices are exogenously given. An alternative
model is the subsistence approach, where farmers minimize their labour efforts
subject to a subsistence constraint ("full belly" model). The effect of an increase in
the output price wil be completely different under this assumption. A higher
output price implies that the household can obtain the same (subsistence) income
by producing less intensive, which reduces the problem of soIl erosion.25
If the conc1usion is so critically dependent on the assumptions made, which model
gives the most realistic description of the farmers' adaptation and responses?
Definite tests of the subsistence versus the income-maximizing hypothesis are
difficult to formulate, and are rarely undertaken in empirical work (López, 1992).
It is commonly argued that the subsistence model may be the most appropriate for
traditional societies, whereas the model with exogenous prices (open economy
model) gives a better description of a modernized society (e.g., Stryker, 1976).
However, if one also con siders migration, the assumption used in our model
would clearly give a more realistic description. A key variable in decisions
concerning migration is the difference in expected income between the old and
new location, as discussed in section 5.
24 Mathematically, this is to say that gl/u -: O.
25 See Angelsen (1994) for a more detail 
ed discussion.
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The two assumptions also reflect differences in time perspective; the
income-maximizing model is more relevant for the long term adaptation. One
reason is migration, another is the fact that a subsistence requirement is not static
and change (normally increase) over time. Smallholders are often subject to strong
social pressures to indulge in new expenditures.
Input prices (wage)
The effect of an increase in the price of inputs in period 1 (e.g., a wage increase in
the case of labour) is readily seen from Figure 1; the marginal costs curve shifts
upward, implying reduced inputs, and therefore less erosion. The discussion is
parallel to the case when period 1 output price increases; present farming is less
profitable, and therefore less intensive practices are applied. Similarly, the effect
on soil conservation investments depends on how the marginal profitabilty of
such investments changes with the soil stock. We may reasonably assume (as done
above) that increased w¡ reduces the investments, but the net effect is stil less
erosion.
In addition to land, labour is the most important input in traditional agriculture. It
is therefore of particular interest to see what determines the wage leve1, or the
opportunity costs of labour (which may be wage labour, self employment, etc.).
High population growth would generally lead to a lower wage leve1 (at least in the
short run). The effect in our model wil be increased soil erosion, which then
provides a theoretical foundation for the conventional argument of the link
between population growth and environmental degradation. It also suggests that
providing attractive alternative (off-farm) employment, which increases the
opportunity costs of farming labour (w¡ in our model), is important in reducing
soil erosion.
Proposltion 5: A lower wage rate (opportunity costs of labour) in period 1, for
example, due to high population growth or reduced availability of attractive
offlarm labour, wil result in more intensive farming and increased soil
erosion.
Costs of soil conservation
A final exogenous parameter in our model is the costs of soil conservation
investments (q). Higher costs wil, obviously, lead to reduced investments, and
therêfore contribute to increased erosion. It may indirectly also have an effect on
inputs in period l; following our assumptions above these wil be reduced, but the
net effect is stil to increase soil erosion.
The costs of soil conservation investments would inc1ude information costs. This
opens up for government policies and programmes that reduce the costs of soil
conservation to have a constructive role to play, for example, through information
and extension services. More directly the government can influence the costs
through, for example, subsidising inputs used for soil conservation.
25
Proposition 6: Lower costs of soil conservation investments, for example,
through information and extension programmes, wil increase such
investments and thereby reduce soil erosion.
5 Upland land degradation, property regimes and migration
5.1 A simple migration model
Whereas we in the previous section study decisions at the fa.rm level, we now
mo ve to the macro level and study some general equilibrium effects. This section
presents a simple model to study the effects on migration of various changes in
economic variables, policies and land rights regimes, which may have
implications for the extent of soil erosion in our study area. Westar out by
considering a stylized economy described by the following characteristics. There
are two areas (regions); the uplands (u) and the lowlands (l). We assume that land
in each region (L) is fixed; i = regions u and l.
The total population (N) in the two regions is fixed, and is allocated between the
two regions through unrestricted migration. This may not correspond with the
Tanzanian reality, where there are restrictions on migration and where one may
start farming. However, in a long term perspective, the income differentials
between regions wil influence migration. Even in the presence of some
constraints on migration, market forces wil be at work.
We consider only agricultural activities, and one homogenous output (Y) in each
region. The farm gate prices (Pi) excluding taxes, are exogenously given, that is
the price is not influenced by the production in the two regions (e.g., sold at a
larger national or world market). The prices take into account costs of
transportation to markets.
Formally, the economy is described by these equations;26
(8) - - ff.dY¡ = f ¡(N¡,L¡) =f¡(N¡); J ¡ ). O, J ii c: O; i = u,l
(9) N = Nu + Ni
The first equation is the production functions in the two sectors, where the fixed
land (L) can be inc1uded in the functional form, thus produetion (Y) is a (strictly)
concave 'function of the only variable input, population in the region (N). The
sec ond equation simply states that total population is fixed, and allocated between
the two regions.
It is commonly assumed that the negative environmental effects of agricultural
production, for example, soil erosion and loss of biodiversity, are higher in the
uplands. Soil erosion may be higher due to more erodable soil in the steeper
terrain. Loss of biodiversity may be higher due to the simple fact that more virgin
26 This presentation is partly inspired by Sinn (1988), but is also based on the reasoning of
standard textbooks in environmental and development economics.
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habitats are left in the uplands, and these are reduced when population increases.
Thus, soil erosion (E) is assumed to be positively related to the population size in
the uplands, as captured in equation (10) below. For simplicity, we assume that
there are no environmental problems in the lowlands; the essence of this
formulation being that environmental problems are more severe in the uplands.
The soil erosion discussed in this model could be both on-farm and off-farm.
(10) E = e(Nu); el)- O
To dose our model we need to state how labour is allocated between the uplands
and the lowlands. The socially optimal allocation, where one includes both the
production benefits and the environmental costs, is found when the net social
benefits or welfare, (PuYu+ Pi Yi - E), is maximized. The necessary condition for
. .
maximum is;
(11) pul - el = p,/
The net marginal loss of the last migrant leaving the uplands, after takng into
account the reduced erosion that follows, should equal the produetion gain in the
lowlands from this migrant. The model now consists of five equations, with Yi, Ni
and E as the five endogenous variables in the model, and Li" Pi' N, and the
technology contained in the form of the production functions as exogenous
parameters.
The optimal allocation of population between the two regions is ilustrated in
Figure 3 below. The length of the "box" is the total population. The optimal
solution is at A, where the marginal social benefits are the same in both regions.
Marginal private
benefits in uplands Marginal benefitsin lowlands
(private = social
N _
u
_ Ni
Total population
Figure 3. The long-term allocation of the population between the lowlands and
the uplands.
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5.2 The free market solution
We now compare the socially optimal solution with the free market solution. The
individual migrant would only consider the income (s)he gets at his/her present
place of residence with the expected income at the new place. The environmental
costs are spread out on the many, and therefore not included in the individual
decision-making. The individual farmer only con siders the costs and benefits (s)he
is facing directly.
Further, farmers would look at the net price after deducting a possible output tax (
ti :2 O), which could be an export tax27 or a sa1es tax for goods at a local market
(although the latter would be more difficult to enforce);
(12) (Pu - tuVu = (Pi- ti)/ = w
The underlying assumption is that new migrants to an area receive an income
equal to their marginal productivity, which is in line with the tradition following
the Harris- Todaro (1970) expected income migration model. This would be the
case if, for example, they are hired as wage labour and the labour market is
reasonably competitive. Alternatively, one could assume that even though land in
each region is fixed, all land is not under cultivation, and newcomers have to settle
on the marginal land (in terms of soil quality, slope, location, etc.). This may be
the assumption closest to the Tanzanian reality, where (as already noted) only 13
percent of the potentially arable land is currently under cultivation (the remaining
87 percent may, however, include fallow land in a shifting cultivation system,
which should be considered agriculturalland).
The solution to this model is also ilustrated in Figure 3 above. The market
solution is at point B, which would give a too high population in the uplands
where the environmentalproblems are largest.
Proposition 7: The free migration solution wil cause too high population in
the uplands, and excessive environmental problems, compared to the socially
optimal solution. (Potential) migrants wil not consider the environmental
costs of their decisions.
This lesson is fundamental in environmental economics; the more than 70 years
old wisdom of Pigou. Yet, its implications are not always fully appreciated in
analysis and policy making relatedto environmental problems. One important
corollary to this way of reasoning is that the problem is not ignorant, uninformed
and uneducated farmers, but the underlying incentives. Thus, programmes to
address the erosion problem through information, training, and (other) extension
services may be expected to have limited effects, unless the underlying incentive
structures are changed.
27 Export taxes on agricultural produce were removed in the mid 1980s in Tanzania (Tax
Commission, 1991).
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Now we consider the effect of higher net farm gate price for agricultural produce
in the uplands, for example, due to improved rural roads that lower transportation
costs (Pu up) or reduced output taxes (tu down). The curves for the marginal
benefits in uplands wil shift upward in Figure 3 by a factor equal to the price
increase. It wil be attractive to move from the lowlands to the uplands untIl a new
migration equilibrium is restored, with an even higher population in the uplands.
A similar shift may be caused by technological progress in the uplands, e.g.,
improvements in the genetic plant material and improved production technologies,
resulting in higher upland population.
Proposition 8: The extent of soil erosion is determined by the relative
profitability of upland agriculture. Higher farm gate prices in the uplands, for
example, because of technical progress or lower transportation (marketing)
costs due to improvements in infrastructure, wil increase the problems. 1n the
same way, well intended measures to "help the uplands" which increase the
income (or welfare more gene rally) in the uplands may increase
environmental problems.
Proposition 9: An important policy measure to reduce upland soil erosion
would be to increase the profitability of lowland farming. Thus, the key to the
upland problem lies in the lowlands.
For example Mwalyosi (1992) suggests improvements in transport and
communication infrastructure to increase agricultural production in the highland
zone. It may help in achieving the short term income objectives. The effect may,
however, also be increased land degradation due to increased population pressure.
Moreover, through migration the long term effects on income is also uncertain, as
migration tend to reduce income differences between regions.
In drawing-Figure 3, we have assumed that thetax paid by the marginal migrant is
lower than the marginal erosion costs: tfu oe e'. We note that if we set the output
tax such that tfu = e' in equilibrium and ti = O, then the socially optimal solution
wil be achieved. This means that the farmers on the margin must pay a tax equal
to the marginal erosion costs. Thus, in considering migration from the uplands to
the lowlands (or the other direction), potential migrants include a reduced tax
payment in their decision making which is equal to the reduction in erosion. In
this way the tax system makes the farmers behave as if they included the
environmentalcosts. The environmental externalities are internalized in farers
decision making. Graphically, this is obtained by moving the upper curve
downwards (by increasing the tax) untIl point B coincides with point A.
Proposition 10: A tax on output from uplands can be used to correct the
market solution, that is to achieve the socially optimal leve! of upland
population and erosion through market mechanisms.28
28 This conclusion that an output tax would correct the environmental externality is crucially
dependent on our assumption of only one input in the production function. With more than one
input, e.g., land, labour and fertilizers, an optimal policy would not be an output tax, but rather
a direct tax on the externality. It the externality is related to the area of land used, a land tax
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Modifying the model, a general population increase can be ilustrated graphically
by extending the "box" in Figure 3. This willead to an increase in both the upland
and lowland populations. The distribution of the increase between the two regions
depends on the production technology in the two regions (the elasticity of
marginal productivity). Note that in this model the effects of a population increase
do not depend on whether the increase occurs in the lowlands or the uplands;
through migration the long term equilibrium wil be the same.
The simple framework presented above could be extended in several directions, as
done in the following sections. One way to add realism to the above model is to
inc1ude inter-sectoral transfer costs (costs of moving, etc.). Thus for an individual
or a family to move, a positive income differential between the two regions must
exist in order to compensate for these costs. We may therefore have an
equilibrium situation with income differential, which would be less than the
transfer costs. Introducing such costs would not change any of the main
mechanisms in the model. 29
The existence of risk and risk aversion is another factor which may cause the
expected income to be different between the two regions in a long term
equilibrium. One could realistically assume that both production and market
(price) risks are higher in upland agriculture. To compensate for the higher income
variations, the expected income must be higher in the uplands in equilbrium.
Proposition 11: Reduced risk in upland agriculture, for example, through
price stabilization measures, wil increase lowland-to-upland migration or
reduce upland-to-lowland migration, and thereby escalate the soil erosion
problem.
5.3 Thelmportance-Df diferent property regimes
The development of (private) property rights is in generallinked positively to the
intensity of production (see discussion in Angelsen, 1995b). Thus, the uplands
tend to have less secure and well established property rights than the lowlands. In
this section we relax the assumption that new migrants receive an income
according to their marginal productivity. Instead we move to the other extreme,
and assume that total upland production is shared equally among its population
(including newcomers). This is a situation of open access.30 Typically this could be
would be the solution; if related to chemical fertilizer use, a fertilizer tax would be the optimal
policy. Land taxes would, however, entail higher administrative costs, and would be more
diffcult to enforce (see for example Skinner, 1993). Thus, in a second-best world, output taxes
may stil be the optimal instrument.
29 It would, however, modify the above conclusion that the outcome do 
es not depend on where
the population growth takes place. If, as an example, we are in a situation where the equilibrium
income is higher in the uplands than in the lowlands, a small population increase in the uplands
would not lead to any migration. It would lower the upland income, but not sufficient to cause
any migration.
30 This situation is commonly referred to as a common property regime (CPR), but CPR would
normallyinclude somerestrictions.onaccess,which is.not the case inourmodel. However, it
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the case if the dominating agricultural practice in the uplands (highlands zone) is
cattle holding, as pastoral land is often open access (or common property),
whereas crop production dominates in the lowlands. The migration equilibrium
condition now becomes;
(13) (Pu-tu)f~(Nu) - (p t \P -Nu - 1- l1 l - W
Farmers in the uplands receive an income equal to the value of the ave rage
productivity, while lowland farmers get an income according to their marginal
productivity. This is ilustrated in Figure 4 below.
Marginal benefits
in lowlands
(private = social)
B
N _
u
_ Ni
Total populatíon
Figure 4. Migration equilibrium in a situation with open access in the uplands.
The new equilibrium is given in point C, and should be compared to the previous
equilibrium in B. Because of decreasing marginal productivity as the population
increases in the region, the average productivity curve would be below the
marginal productivity curve. Thus, the new equilibrium implies more people in the
uplands, and therefore an intensification of the soil erosion problems.
(Potential) migrants from the uplands wil receive more than their contribution to
increased production (the income is higher than the value of marginal
productivjty). All potentialland rent is dissipated. Thus we have another kind of
negative external effects, as potential migrants by not leaving the uplands lower
the income to the population in the uplands. They do not take into account that
they influence other farmers' income. The result is overpopulation in the uplands,
relative to the available land resources, due to the lack of property rights regime in
the uplands.
The loss in production and income is equal to the triangle (below the BC line) in
Figure 4. Upland farmers in the BC segment of the figure would have had a higher
resembles the,.equal sharing characteristics ofmany CPRs.
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productivity in the lowlands; graphically this is shown by the fact that the
marginal productivity curve for the uplands is below the marginal productivity
curve for the lowlands. Note that this production loss comes in addition to the loss
due to environmental externalities in the uplands, as discussed above.
Proposition 12: A property rights regime in the uplands based on equal
sharing of the production output willead to even higher population and, by
extension, more land degradation in the uplands. In addition to the socialloss
in the first model due to environmental externalities, there is a production loss
since upland income does not rejlect farmers marginal productivity.
The other policy lessons from section 5.1 would also be valid here.
5.4 The role of off-farm employment and rural-urban migration
We now extend the analysis to include off-farm employment in paricularly urban
areas (townships or densely populated areas). Large scale rural-urban migration is
an important feature of most developing countries, including Tanzania. For
simplicity, we have only one agricultural sector (the uplands). Potential migrants
base their decisions on the difference between their present income and the
expected income (wage) in the cities (we). The latter is given by bwt. where b is the
probability of getting a job, and wt is the (average) wage leve1 in town. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the income is zero when unemployed. Moreover, b
and wt are given in the model. Note that people often move to towns in search for
employment, that is without having any particular job aranged for before leaving.
Thus, the ex ante decision is based on expected income, but migrants wil end up
ex post with either higher (become employed) or lower (remain unemployed)
income.
We mayidentify at least twodifferent market solutions ih this modei;31
(14) (Pu - tu'J = bwt upland income based on marginal productivity
(D in Figure 5)
(15) (Pu-tu)f~(Nu) b t= WNu upland income based on average productivity
(E in Figure 5)
The two . possible equilibrium situations are ilustrated in Figure 5 below. In the
first case, when upland income is determined according to marginal productivity,
the upland population is given according to (14) at point D. In the sec ond case,
where the income is based on average productivity, the upland income for a'given
upland population is higher (the curve is above the marginal productivity curve in
the figure), thus the equilibrium leve1 of upland population wil also be higher
(point E).
31 These solutions assume that migrants are risk neutral, i.e., we can use expected values. It we
inc1uded risk aversion, migrants would demand the higher expected income in town to
compensate for the higher income risk.
32
expected urban income
Average private
benefits in uplands
Marginal private
benefits in uplands
N _
u
Figure 5. Rural-urban migration.
Proposition 13: The expected urban income is a crucial variable in this
approach, and the main factor in de term in ing upland population and thereby
the extent of soil erosion and land degradation. Better off-farm working
opportunities, that is, higher urban wage and/or reduced unemployment in the
urban sector, is a key to reducing environmental problems in the up lands.
Proposition 14: A property rights regime which gives farmers an income
equal to their ave rage productivity will, also in this model, result in too high
population and environmental problems in the uplands.
We have not included the socially optimal solutions in the figure. If the only
externality considered is upland land degradation, then the optimal point would
obviously be to the left of point D. This could be corrected by, for example,
introducing an output tax on agricultural produce in the uplands, i.e., by moving
the marginal productivity curve downwards in the figure. A more complete
economic analysis should, however, also inc1ude the urban congestion problems
(which is a major source of urban environmental problems). Moreover,
unemployment represents a waste of resources which should be taken into account
in the overall analysis.
We should also note that there is a trade-off between upland environmental and
urban congestion (environmental) problems. This trade-off would, of course, not
be fixed, and a challenge would be to reduce it by, for example, introducing
incentives for better farming practices in the uplands, and public sewage projects
in the cities. Still, even though the trade-off can be reduced, it is hard to eliminate
it all together.
A possible extension of the above migration model is to inc1ude leisure in the
migrants objective functions, and use the family rather than the individual as the
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decision unit. This would, as shown by Stark (1983), lead to more rural urban
migration, and reduce upland population in the model.
6 Conc1usion: The challenge of sustainable intensification of
Tanzanian agriculture
The challenge of achieving a more efficient and long term use of land resources in
Tanzania (and other SubSaharan countries) is parallel to the twin problems in the
debate on sustainable development: How to increase the income to the farmers,
while conserving the land quality (i.e., the long term income opportunities)? This
is the challenge of sustainable intensification of tropical agriculture.
Agricultural intensification, however, of ten implies that farmers must accept to
temporarily reduce their current consumption levels (and/or reduce their amount
of leisure ) in order to enhance the productivity of their land and to maintain their
income-earning capacity in the future. if this challenge is not met, incomes wil
continue to decrease and current consumption wil be increasingly financed from
dissaving, which wil eventually lead to inadvertent loss of assets, inc1uding land
(Platteau, 1995).
The model presented in section 4 suggests that increased income without
environmental degradation may be achieved by a combination of agricultural
intensification and investments in soil conservation. A number of policy measures
can be used to promote this development. Investments in soil conservation can be
boosted through increased tenure security, reduction of poverty which lowers
farmers' discount rate, economic stability which lead to expectations about high
output prices in the future, and lower costs of soil conservation measures.
Intensification which increases present income wil similarly be stimulated by
higher output prices, technological improvements, and reductions in input prices.
Note that because of the conflct between soil conservation and intensification,
only an emphasis on the latter could harm the long term income prospects through
increased erosion. A policy package which inc1ude both objectives is called for.
An important aspect not discussed in the model is the crop choice, which may
have significant effects on the erosion rates.
The models in sections 4 and 5 also show that the property rights regime is only
one but several factors which influence farmers' decisions and land management.
Establishing tenure security is clearly an important incentive for farmers to include
long-term considerations into their farming practices, and to undertake
investments in soil conservation and other assets which increase the future
productivity of land. This may not,however, be sufficient to make peasants take
full account of the environmental consequences of their actions. Relative prices
between different agricultural inputs, between different outputs, between inputs
and outputs, and between different regions in the country are equally important.
We have further argued that whereas tenure security is important, it is not an
argument for a particular property rights regime. The farmers' security against
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loosing the land may be high or low within any of the three most important
categories of property regime; private, communal and state property (section 2.1).
Furthermore, the security of tenure would be a subjective variable, thus depending
on factors such as the local customs, the (perceived) protection given in national
laws and courts, political and economic stability, etc.
Related to the discussion of the desirability of various land rights regimes, there
seems to be some confusion on the terminology used. The Tanzanian property
rights system could be described as one where the user and income rights are
assigned to the individual peasants, whereas the right to transfer the land is kept
with the community (sections 2.1 and 2.2). Is it correct to label a system where
two (probably the most important) of three categories of rights are de facto with
individual peasants as a communal property rights regime, or is it more proper to
call it a private property regime? Paradoxically, it seems that communal
management is successful when the system is able to secure individual user rights.
There seems to be strong empirical evidence for an evolution of more
individualized property rights as land becomes more scarce, either within a system
of so-called communal management, or through the development of legal
individual rights with formal titles (see Angelsen, 1995b). The proposed land
reforms by the Land Commission (1994) may facilitate such a development, and
therefore not interfere with what many would argue is a "natural" development of
more individualized land rights. If the right to transfer and allocate land remains
with the community, the argument of increased inequality going in tandem with
private property rights could be avoided. However, Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994),
based on the Kenyan experience, and others, argue that the fear for increased
inequality is exaggerated. We agree with Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994:25), who
conc1ude that the government, while being ready to intervene to assist in the
development of land tenure systems, should focus its scarce resources on real
constraints on agricultural productivity, such as inadequate production technology,
and market inefficiencies. The key question for the government to ask is, "What
actions are needed to giv e peasants the incentives to make long-term productivity
and land improving investments?"
Given that land is becoming a more scarce resource, the conflcts and allocation
problems become harder. A system where the de jure rights are with the
community means that the allocation of land is determined in a political and
bureaucratic system, not in a market system as with formal. private property.
Political power is substituted for economic power. There are pros and cons of both
ways of allocating land. It is naïve to only look at the positive sides of one system
and the negative ones of the other. A pragmatic approach is needed. We should,
however, not underestimate the potential problems connected with the customary
system proposed by the Land Commission (1994). By allowing decisions on land
allocation to be subjugated to bureaucratic and political controls through the
vilage assemblies, possible problems of misuse and malpractice may thrive. Thus,
a major challenge wil be to develop procedures and practices which make the
allocation of vil age lands transparent and subject to public scrutiny.
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